Before a new plane can fly in the USA, the F.A.A., in partnership with manufacturers, assesses the technology, design and components that make up the jet. They look for potential safety issues that could affect the airworthiness of the plane.

The F.A.A.’s response to the crisis has also come under scrutiny. As authorities in other countries moved quickly to ban the plane following the crash in Ethiopia this month, the American regulator held off.

While Cayman Airways quickly stopped flying their Boeing 737 Max’s, in fact the first airline in the world to ground the plane, most American airlines continued flying them.

At last the F.A.A.’s woefully slow response to the crisis has now come under scrutiny. Nearly every airline in the world had grounded the 737 Max the American regulator held off. Why?

The investigations into the crashes are ongoing, but the similarities between the two doomed flights suggest potential problems with the new software system, known as MCAS. In the case of the Lion Air crash in October, the automated system may have engaged based on erroneous data, creating a struggle for the pilots who were trying to maintain control.

Why didn’t this software emerge as a major focus for the F.A.A. regulators who certified the Max as safe to fly in 2017? The new non-rechargeable lithium batteries did. They were labelled a ‘special condition?’

According to media sources in the USA senior F.A.A. officials were not even aware of this new software system. This system was installed as a safety feature to make the 737 Max, which included significant design changes, fly like earlier models.

The new, more efficient engines on the 737 Max were larger and placed in a different location than previous generations. To compensate for the new aerodynamics, Boeing installed the software, which would force the nose of the plane down in certain circumstances. The goal was to help avoid a stall.

The F.A.A., in its approval of the plane, did not require training on the software, a sign that regulators did not see the system as critical for pilots to understand. Nor did the F.A.A. require pilots who could fly the predecessor 737 to train on a simulator in order to fly the Max. Most pilots did not know about MCAS until after the Lion Air crash.

The regulators also approved the software to be triggered after receiving data from only one so-called angle-of-attack sensor. The decision allowed for the system to have a single point of potential failure, a rarity in aviation safety.

Certifying the 737 Max was a collaborative effort between the F.A.A. and Boeing. The regulator for decades has relied on employees at aircraft manufacturers to assist in the review process.

After the Lion Air crash last October, Boeing said they would provide the software fix by the end of last year. They did not. They have now said it be forthcoming in a few weeks.

Even before the two 737’s crashed the ‘cozy’ relationship between Boeing and the F.A.A. raised concern.

A 2015 report by the inspector general’s office expressed concern about the certification process. “During our review, industry representatives expressed concern that F.A.A.’s focus was often on paperwork — not on safety-critical items,” the report said.

“Boeing and the F.A.A. have had an almost symbiotic relationship,” said Michael Dreikorn, an aviation safety expert who previously worked in a safety oversight role at the F.A.A. “The relationship is too cozy.”

Already Boeing is receiving law suits and it can be no surprise if Cayman Airways follows with a claim to be reimbursed for all of its out of pocket costs they have incurred by the grounding of their two brand new 737 Max jets.

Bigger claims from the families of the victims who died in the two crashes are likely to be sent not only to Boeing but the F.A.A.

Let’s see how big a cover up is executed and how slowly all the claims will be settled?

As for confidence in the F.A.A.? That has been seriously damaged.

SOURCE MATERIAL: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/business/boeing-elaine-chao.html